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Introduction
Several significant developments occurred in the field of trade law within the 
last two years.  This section on African Practice in International Economic Law 
provides a broad overview of some of these developments highlighting how they 
have changed the trade landscape within the continent and what this signifies 
for rule-based multilateralism both at regional and global level. 
I   THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA (AFCFTA)
The Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)1 
was signed at the 10th Extraordinary Summit of the AU Assembly on March 21, 
2018 in Kigali, Rwanda and entered into force on May 30, 2019. The AfCFTA, 
a by-product of the 1994 Abuja Treaty,2 aims to create a ‘single market for goods, 
services, free movement of persons and capital, and liberalised market for goods 
and services in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent.’3 
The AfCFTA is part of a wider plan for continental integration, which is seen by 
many within and outside the continent as an important development framework. 
The AfCFTA will cover a market of 1.2 billion people and a gross domestic 
product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion, across the 55-member States of the African 
Union,4 making it the largest trade Agreement since the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).5 
1 See African Union, Agreement Establishing the Continental Free Trade Area (adopted Mar. 
21, 2018) [hereinafter AfCFTA Treaty], available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/trea-
ties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf; Regis Y. Simo, Trade in Services in the 
African Continental Free Trade Area: Prospects, Challenges and WTO Compatibility, 23 J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 65–95 (2020).
2 See Organization of African Unity, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (June 
3, 1991) [hereinafter Abuja Treaty], https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-0016_-_
treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_e.pdf. 
3 Id. art. 3.
4 Collins C. Ajibo, African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The Euphoria, Pitfalls and Pros-
pects, 53 J. World Trade 871–94 (2019). See also Third World Network–Africa Publication, 
AfCFTA Phase 1 Negotiations: Issues and Challenges for Eastern Africa, at 2 (2019), 
http://twnafrica.org/wp/2017/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/AfCFTA-Phase-1.pdf. 
5 Kingsley Ighobor, Africa Set for a Massive Free Trade Area, UN Africa Renewal (Aug. – Nov. 2018), 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-november-2018/africa-set-massive-free-trade-
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Structured in two phases, Phase I negotiations which have been concluded 
focused on a single continental market for goods and services with a Protocol 
on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes. The Agreement 
contains nine annexes related to: rules of origin, customs cooperation and 
mutual administrative assistance, trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers, technical 
barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, transit, and trade 
remedies. However, exceptions of Annex 1 on Schedules for Tariff Concessions, 
Schedules of Specific Commitments for Trade in Services, an Appendix on the 
AfCFTA Rules of Origin remain outstanding. Harmonising rules of origin 
across the various regional economic communities (RECs) has proven quite 
divisive among members. This is because certain countries prefer the use of 
product-specific rules ‘where countries tailor the design of the rules in relation to 
a particular sector of economic interest on one hand, and general rules of origin 
that normally apply to all sectors, irrespective of product.’6 Phase II negotiations 
focusing on competition, investment and intellectual property (IP) were 
scheduled to start in 2020 but has been suspended as a result of the global health 
pandemic caused by COVID-19. South Africa’s Wamkele Mene is the inaugural 
Secretary General of the AfCFTA and his appointment is for four years.
The AfCFTA comes at a time when global trade is facing both structural 
and political challenges, such as the stalemate at the WTO dispute settlement 
body and the China-US trade war. Therefore, it is not surprising that analysis 
of the impact of the AfCFTA project that the Agreement will positively impact 
trade and international economic activities on the continent on three main 
fronts. First, it will boost intra-regional trade and development. Businesses 
within the continent currently face high tariffs. Currently, intra-continental 
tariffs stands at 6.1 per cent7 making Africa one of the most unfavourable 
area; African Continental Free Trade Area: Questions & Answers, African Union, UNECA & 
African Trade Policy Centre (2018), https://www.uneca.org/publications/african-con-
tinental-free-trade-area-questions-answers. See also David Luke, Making the Case for 
the African Continental Free Trade Area, Afronomics law.org (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.
afronomicslaw.org/2019/01/12/making-the-case-for-the-african-continental-free-trade-
area-2/. 
6 African Leaders Launch Continental Free Trade Area, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (2020), https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/african-
leaders-launch-continental-free-trade-area. See also The African Continental Free Trade 
Area: A Tralac Guide 5 (6th ed. 2019).
7 African Continental Free Trade Area: Questions & Answers, African Union, UNECA 
& African Trade Policy Centre (2018), https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/
PublicationFiles/qa_cfta_en_230418.pdf [hereinafter AfCFTA Q&A]. According to the 
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climates for business. Further, only 10 to 12 percent of African trade is 
between African countries compared to 40 percent of trade between North 
American countries, and 63 percent of European trade.8 The AfCFTA, it is 
hoped, will reduce and eventually eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) between African states, which will boost trade between member 
states, make it easier for African businesses to trade within the continent, and 
foster healthy competition in many sectors within the continent. In fact, the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) estimates that the AfCFTA has the 
potential both to boost intra-African trade by 52.3 per cent by eliminating 
import duties, and to double this trade if non-tariff barriers are also reduced.9 
Outside of trade, many analysts believe the Agreement will also improve the 
quality of infrastructure and industrialization, including transportation and 
electricity as well as to facilitate the goals of intra-African trade liberalization.10 
Second, the creation of the WTO globally expanded international trade and 
investment in services. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), in 2019 trade in services exports accounted 
for 7 per cent of world GDP at US$6.0 trillion, even though Africa services 
exports amounted to less than 3 per cent of GDP.11 Meanwhile, in 2014, 
manufactured products represented 14.8 percent of African exports to the rest 
of the world, compared with 41.9 percent of intra-African exports.12 Therefore, 
it is not surprising that one of the key arguments in favour of, and benefit of the 
AfCFTA, is export diversification. It is projected that the AfCFTA will promote 
trade diversification that will produce sustainable growth, particularly the type 
of trade that moves away from unreliable extractive industries and commodities 
towards finished and value-added products, thereby creating African-led 
development and industrialization.  Furthermore, it is hoped that liberalisation 
in services, if implemented as proposed in the AfCFTA, will promote sectoral 
AfCFTA Negotiation Modalities, tariffs on non-sensitive products will be eliminated 
after five years (non-LDCs) or 10 years (LDCs). Tariffs on sensitive products will be 
eliminated after 10 years (non-LDCs) or 13 years (LDCs). See Third World Network–
Africa Publication, supra note 4, at 16.
8 James Thuo Gathii, Agreement Establishing The African Continental Free Trade Area, 58 Int’l 
Legal Materials 1028–83 (2019).
9 AfCFTA Q&A, supra note 7.
10 Gathii, supra note 8, at 1028.
11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2019 e-Handbook on 
Statistics (2019), https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/Services/Total.html#figure1. 
12 African Leaders, supra note 6.
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and industrial growth and foster a coherence in continent-wide policy based 
on transparent, inclusive and integrated single services market in Africa.13 
Finally, the creation of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism within the 
AfCFTA framework provides for the rules and procedures for the settlement 
of disputes in a transparent and predictable way consistent with the provisions 
of the AfCFTA.14 The Settlement of Dispute Protocol, akin to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), will help in building jurisprudence and 
expertise on trade dispute settlement within Africa. This is crucial as many 
African States are reluctant to engage with the WTO DSB. Importantly, the 
AfCFTA provides for different options for dispute settlement such as arbitration, 
conciliation, good office and mediation.15 Thus, it is only after parties fail to 
resolve their disagreement using one of the dispute settlement options will a 
formal panel under the AfCFTA DSM be established. The provision of other 
means of dispute settlement, commentators believe, offers a ‘genuine way 
forward to forge an engaged dispute resolution that is relevant for integration.’16
Of course, there are worries that many African countries are unprepared 
to implement their AfCFTA commitments as the Agreement goes into full 
effect. The Nigerian-Benin border closure, for instance, underscores this 
concern.17 However, this singular act raises questions about the willingness of 
countries to comply with the AfCFTA. Other commentators such as Franklin 
Obeng‐Odoom, opines that as a result of its ‘exclusive focus on continental 
Africa, disinterest in systemic redistribution, and encouragement of the private 
appropriation of socially created land rents prevents AfCFTA from achieving 
13 Preamble of the AfCFTA Treaty’s Protocol on Trade in Services [hereinafter Services Protocol], 
available at AfCFTA Treaty, supra note 1, at 31.
14 See also James Thuo Gathii, Introduction to the Symposium on Dispute Settlement in the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement, Afronomicslaw.org (2019), 
 https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/08/introduction-to-the-symposium-on-dispute-set-
tlement-in-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement/. 
15 AfCFTA Treaty’s Protocol on Rules and Procedures on Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter 
Settlement of Dispute Protocol], available at AfCFTA Treaty, supra note 1, at 59 (Article 8).
16 Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, What the African Continental Free Trade Agreement Protocol on Dispute 




17 Landry Signé & Colette van der Ven, Nigeria’s Benin border closure is an early warning 
sign for the African free trade deal, Quartz Africa (2019), https://qz.com/africa/1741064/
nigerias-benin-border-closure-is-a-warning-for-afcfta-trade-deal/. 
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its goals.’18 This is because the AfCFTA has failed to take seriously the problem 
of inequality between Members as well as soaring nativism and protectionism 
around the world. As a result, the Agreement risks deepening the continent-wide 
poverty and inequality. Despite these challenges, Africa is better-off with free 
trade than otherwise and the success of the AfCFTA will depend on political 
will of its Members, technical capacity, and appropriate use of availability of 
existing resources to redress the anomalies already present in the Continent. 
II   CHINA-MAURITIUS FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
On October 17, 2019, the Republic of Mauritius and the People’s Republic of 
China signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The negotiations were officially 
launched in December 2017 and formally concluded on September 2, 2018 after 
four rounds of intensive negotiations. The Agreement comprises 17 Chapters 
covering trade in goods, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers 
to trade, competition, intellectual property, E-commerce, trade in services, 
investment and economic cooperation.19 The FTA also contains Annexes on 
rules of origin, market access for goods schedule for Mauritius and China.
The China-Mauritius FTA is part of a larger move by China to further 
integrate into the global economy in general and to expand its trade relations 
with Africa in particular. Another objective of the FTA is to further expand 
bilateral trade and investment interactions between the two countries, proffer 
new ideas on a China-Africa comprehensive strategic partnership and elevate 
China-Africa economic and trade cooperation. The China-Mauritius agreement 
is the first free trade agreement between China and an African country.20 
III   MOROCCO — DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON 
SCHOOL EXERCISE BOOKS FROM TUNISIA21
Tunisia, on 21 February 2019, requested the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
to establish a panel to examine anti-dumping duties imposed by Morocco 
18 Franklin Obeng‐Odoom, The African Continental Free Trade Area, 79 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 167 (2020). 
19 China and Mauritius Sign Free Trade Agreement, China FTA Network (2019), 
 http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/chinamauritiusen/enmauritius/201910/41658_1.html. 
20 Id.
21 DS578: Morocco — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on School Exercise Books from Tunisia 
(Dispute Settlement Body, World Trade Organization 2020).
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on imports of school exercise books. The measure at issue was the definitive 
anti-dumping measure imposed on imports of school exercise books from 
Tunisia. According to Tunisia, these measures were inconsistent with a number 
of provisions under the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement22 and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994.23 More specifically, Tunisia 
questioned the evidence of dumping, injury or a causal link of dumping and 
the calculation of an artificially high normal price of school exercise books. 
According to Tunisia, Morocco had failed to comply with its obligations under 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to disclose the analysis of injury 
suffered by the domestic industry and details of the findings and conclusions 
reached, which led to the imposition of the measure at issue. On the basis of 
these and other reasons, Tunisia requested that the DSB establish a panel to 
examine this matter. 
The Morocco-Anti Dumping case establishes both a precedent and an 
opportunity. First, it is a precedent in that it is the first WTO dispute involving 
two African countries as a complainant and as respondent, even though this is 
the second time that Morocco is involved in a dispute proceeding at the WTO. 
Second, it is an opportunity for African countries, which are generally reluctant 
to litigate international trade matters, to both build their technical expertise 
and to contribute to the growing body of WTO jurisprudence. Unfortunately, 
by taking this dispute to the WTO, Tunisia missed an opportunity to establish 
an intra-REC trade dispute record.24 In analysing the consultation, Regis Semo 
notes that by filing in the WTO, these countries lost an opportunity to litigate 
the issue in an African international trade court despite Morocco and Tunisia 
being parties to the Arab Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement (AMFTA), 
the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area and the Arab Maghreb Union. Nevertheless, 
it a welcomed improvement that African states are participating in the DSB, 
thereby contributing to the WTO jurisprudence.
22 Articles 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 5.10, 6.5, 6.5.1, 
6.8, 9, 11, 12.2, 12.2.2, 18.1 and paragraphs 1, 3, 5, and 6 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter GATT], Articles II:1(a), II:1(b), VI:1 
and VI:6(a).
24 Regis Y. Simo, The Tunisia/Morocco Scuffle at the WTO: A Missed Opportunity to Establish a Record 
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IV    THE UNITED STATES AND KENYA TO NEGOTIATE A FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT
In December 2018, the White House announced its strategy for future relations 
with Africa.25 This included an expressed desire to increase trade links between 
the two. However, the fruits of this commitment have been a bit hit and miss. 
On the one hand there were positive steps such as the renewal of the African 
Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). On June 28, 2019 the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced the initiation of the annual 
review of the eligibility of sub-Saharan African countries to receive the benefits 
of AGOA.26 As a result of this exercise, 38 countries are currently eligible for 
AGOA benefits.27 However, in stark contrast, in February 2020, the Trump 
administration introduced travel bans for nationals of four African countries: 
Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania. This policy will hinder trade in services 
and investment flows. In the midst of these events came the announcement 
that the US and Kenya would negotiate a trade deal. This followed a meeting 
between the two leaders – President Donald Trump and President Uhuru 
Kenyatta – on February 6, 2020. Subsequent to that meeting (on March 17, 
2020) the US Congress was notified of the intention of the two governments 
to pursue trade negotiations.28 The Kenyan cabinet had already approved the 
launch of formal negotiations on a free trade agreement on January 30, 2020.29 
25 President Donald J. Trump’s Africa Strategy Advances Prosperity, Security, and Stability, The 
White House (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-don-
ald-j-trumps-africa-strategy-advances-prosperity-security-stability/. 
26 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Annual Review of Country Eligibility for 
Benefits Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 31135 (June 28, 2019), 
https://agoa.info/images/documents/15602/federal-regsiter-agoa2019-13905.pdf. The AGOA 
Implementation Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee develops recommen-
dations for the President on AGOA country eligibility. The Subcommittee requests com-
ments and conducts a public hearing on this matter before making the recommendations.
27 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Office of the United States Trade 
Representative https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/afri-
can-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa.  
28 President Trump Announces Intent to Negotiate Trade Agreement with Kenya, Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (Feb. 6, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
press-office/press-releases/2020/february/president-trump-announces-intent-negoti-
ate-trade-agreement-kenya. Luke Anami, US Cranks Up Trade Deal with Kenya, The East 
African (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/US-cranks-up-trade-
deal-with-Kenya/2560-5499796-139up1q/index.html.  
29 Cabinet Approves Start of Free Trade Talks with the US, The Standard (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.stan-
dardmedia.co.ke/article/2001358611/cabinet-meeting-okays-kenya-us-free-trade-talks.   
330 African journal Of international economic law - volume 1 (Fall 2020)
The expressed goals of the trade deal have been enunciated as follows:
•	 To form part of a broader agenda to pursue reciprocal and mutually 
beneficial agreements between the United States and individual 
sub-Saharan African countries. The agreement is to be a model for 
future engagements.
•	 To build on the objectives of AGOA.
•	 To contribute to African regional integration.30
There are concerns that Kenya may not benefit from a free trade agreement 
with the United States in light of the fact that it exports mostly low-value goods 
to the US, while the US exports high value goods to Kenya. Furthermore, the 
trade deal is likely to include provisions that may be easier for the US to comply 
with, than for lesser-developed Kenya. For example, the US favours provisions 
on the facilitation of trade, which would require the implementation of trade 
processing automation and the use of e-commerce in trade. Kenya may struggle 
to implement these reforms due to the heavy financial implications involved. 
There are also concerns that the agreement, if negotiated, could actually 
undermine regional integration efforts, particularly with regard to its 
compatibility with the East African Community (EAC) treaties and the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).31 In relation to the former, 
the protocol on the establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market (2009) has article 37 which concerns the coordination of external 
trade relations. The article requires that members adopt a common negotiating 
position with third parties. Kenya seems to be ignoring this provision by going 
at negotiations with the United States alone, without the other members of 
the EAC. The ethos of the AfCFTA, on the other hand, is that members are 
to concentrate on boosting intra-African trade and are discouraged from 
entering into bilateral trade deals with third parties. There is concern that the 
potential US – Kenya accord could have the effect of increasing barriers to 
30 Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States-Kenya Negotiations: Summary of 
Specific Negotiating Objectives (May 2020), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Summary_
of_U.S.-Kenya_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf. 
31 See, e.g.,  Jack Caporal, Going Solo: What is the Significant of a U.S.-Kenya Free Trade Agreement?, 
CSIS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-solo-what-significance-us-
kenya-free-trade-agreement.  
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intra-African trade and therefore undermining regional integration efforts. 
For example, it is expected that the agreement will include rules of origin to 
ensure that only the products of the parties to the agreement benefit from the 
trade preferences, and excluding goods from other nations from benefiting from 
the arrangement. However, despite these concerns, Kenya is keen to have the 
agreement because it believes that it will lead to greater investment inflows of 
investors who will be seeking to gain access to the US market. Furthermore, 
Kenya is anxious to secure a deal ahead of the expiry of AGOA in 2025.
Kenya would not be the first African country to strike a bilateral trade 
deal with the United States.32 In August 2018, the US and Morocco entered 
into an agreement on the import of US poultry and poultry products into 
Morocco. This was despite Morocco being a member of the Arab Maghreb 
Union33 as well as the Community of Sahel – Saharan States (CEN – SAD) at 
the time.34 However, the US – Morocco agreement is far less comprehensive 
than the proposed US – Kenya deal, as it is a subject – specific agreement. 
Being so narrow, it did not, for example, even require congressional approval 
like the Kenya – US deal will. Furthermore, Morocco is yet to ratify the 
AfCFTA so it can be argued that it is not bound by its stance which discourages 
agreements with third parties. Conversely, Kenya ratified the AfCFTA on 
May 10, 2018 and is therefore bound to heed its commitments thereunder.35
 
V   NEGOTIATIONS TO RENEW THE COTONOU AGREEMENT 
The Cotonou Agreement was entered into in the year 2000 between the 
European Union (EU) and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as 
a successor to the Lomé Agreement of 1975. The intention was to replace the 
former non-reciprocal arrangement with a reciprocal one and to be the basis 
for the formation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the 
two parties.36 The agreement was set to expire on February 29, 2020, unless 
32  Lucas B. Terna, Is Morocco Africa’s Leading Free Trade Bastion?, Afronomicslaw.org (Mar. 20, 
2019), https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/03/20/is-morocco-africas-leading-free-trade-bastion/. 
33 Established in 1989 with 4 other members: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia.
34 Established in 1998 with 29 members.
35 Status of AfCFTA Ratification, TRALAC (last updated May 6, 2020), https://www.tralac.
org/resources/infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html.  
36 There are currently 79 African Caribbean and Pacific countries. 48 of these are sub-Sa-
haran African countries.
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renewed. Negotiations on its renewal were initiated on September 28, 2018.37 
The original agreement had focused on development cooperation, trade and 
political dialogue. Now, new global concerns have arisen, such as climate 
change and the fight against terrorism. The shifting of interests mandated 
a re-evaluation of the framework agreement to reflect modern challenges, 
realities and aspirations.
The only progress that has been made so far in the negotiations is the 
adoption of negotiating mandates by the two sides. The EU Council adopted 
the mandate on June 22, 2018 while the ACP countries adopted theirs on 
May 30, 2018 at an ACP Council of Ministers.38 Secondly, there is a broad 
agreement about the structure of the agreement – the key chapters. A novel (yet 
controversial) aspect is that, in addition to the general framework agreement, 
there are to be three separate agreements for each of the ACP regions. This is to 
take account of the differences in interests of the countries in the three regions.
The expiry of the Cotonou Agreement had to be postponed to December 
2020 owing to delays in the conclusion of the negotiations. There is still a lot of 
ground to be covered in the negotiations and it is unclear whether the extended 
deadline will be met. This is more particularly so on account of the COVID-
19 outbreak which has generally led to a slowdown in all activities across the 
globe, and forced all governments to turn their attention to dealing with the 
health pandemic in their various countries. The parties are yet to consolidate 
the proposals on the provisions, to agree on the institutional structure 
and on the modalities of cooperation, as well as to set the final provisions. 
Some trepidation has been expressed regarding the Cotonou Agreement. 
For one, trade agreements between unequal partners are always challenging 
to construct in a manner that will end in an outcome that is viewed as being 
fair to all sides. Secondly, the diversity of the ACP group (and even of the 
African states themselves as a group) presents challenges to agreeing on 
mutual interests. For example, there have even been divisions among African 
governments over the adoption of the EPAs. Only 14 states have so far accepted 
interim-EPAs with the European Union. Many African states have feared 
37 Cotonou Agreement, European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/coto-
nou-agreement/
38 ACP Negotiating Mandate for a Post-Cotonou Partnership Agreement with the 
European Union, ACP/00/011/188 (adopted May 30, 2018), http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.
waw.be/files/acpdoc/public-documents/ACP0001118_%20ACP_Negotiating_Mandate_EN.pdf. 
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that liberalising trade with Europe will result in the loss of customs revenue, 
which is an important contributor to government revenue. Further, it is 
feared that it may harm African producers whose products may struggle to 
compete with European imports. It is not the African side alone which has 
had challenges that have stalled the integration process. The European side 
has also faced institutional battles that have under-mined their efficacy in 
these negotiations. Indeed, broadly speaking, it has been a difficult time 
for integration in general, given events such as the trade wars and Brexit.
A former Nigerian trade minister remarked that “if 30 years of nonreciprocal 
free market access into the EU did not improve the economic situation of the 
ACP, how can a reciprocal trading arrangement achieve anything better?”39 
This question is a valid one, yet not one to be used as a basis for a decision to 
completely throw out the initiative. Instead, it should be a question that drives 
the impetus to find solutions to improve the effectiveness of the framework.
VI  GENERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES/COMPLAINTS 
Madagascar, Morocco and South Africa Launch Safeguard Investigation at 
the WTO
On January 7, 2019, Madagascar notified the WTO’s Committee on Safeguards 
that on December 31, 2018,  it had decided to initiate a safeguard investigation 
on detergent powder.40 A safeguard is a trade policy measure that is applied 
to ‘protect domestic industries from competition with imports causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury to them.’41 When a country initiates a 
safeguard investigation, it seeks to determine whether increased imports of 
a product are causing, or threatening to cause, serious injury to a domestic 
39 Aliyu Modibo Umar, former Nigerian Minister of Trade. See Kingsley Ighobor, Trade Between 
Two Unequal Partners, Africa Renewal (Aug. 2014), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/mag-
azine/august-2014/trade-between-two-unequal-partners.
40 Madagascar – Notification Under Article 12.1 (A) Of The Agreement On Safeguards On Initiation Of 
An Investigation And The Reasons For It, WTO/ G/SG/N/6/MDG/3 (Jan. 9, 2019). Madagascar 
also initiated safeguard notifications with respect to pasta and oils. The safeguard on pasta was 
notified on July 22, 2019 having been initiated on July 18, 2019. On oil (lubricating oil, and on 
vegetable oils and margarines), the country notified the Safeguard Committee on August 27, 2019 
having been initiated on August 14, 2019. Madagascar levied additional duties on the products 
for a month, and then withdrew them in September, pending further investigations.
41 Yong-Shik Lee, The Agreement on Safeguards, in The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis 749–98, 749 (2005). 
334 African journal Of international economic law - volume 1 (Fall 2020)
industry. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards42 can be applied to any category 
of imported products and, together with Article XIX of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (1994), it sets out the general terms pursuant to which 
WTO members may apply safeguard measures. 
Generally, under WTO law trade, members cannot exceed the quotas and 
tariffs contained in their schedules of concessions. However, members can be 
allowed to bypass this rule where increased imports are causing or threatening 
to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. Thus, safeguard measures protect 
domestic industries over a short period of time from sudden and acute problems 
caused by import competition. 
Madagascar claimed that its domestic detergent powder industry had 
provided evidence showing that imports of detergent powder had increased 
at a rate of 254% both in absolute terms and relative to domestic production 
during the period 2013–2017. This rise in imports, they claimed, had adverse 
consequences on domestic producers of detergent powder, in particular 
regarding levels of production, market share, capacity utilization and sales, and 
had caused their losses to accumulate. The compound effect was an imminent 
collapse of domestic production. Therefore, they argued that the application 
of a safeguard measure would enable the domestic industry to have time to 
make necessary adjustments in terms of the competition that it faced from 
imported detergent powder. 
Similarly, on March 4, 2019, South Africa  notified the Committee on 
Safeguards of the initiation of a safeguard investigation into the surge of 
imports of threaded fasteners of iron or steel.43 The application, lodged by the 
South African Iron and Steel Institute (SAISI) on behalf of the South African 
Fasteners Manufacturers’ Association (SAFMA) and its members, claimed that 
the product was being imported into the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) market in such increasing quantities that it was causing serious injury 
to the SACU industry.44 As a result, producers were experiencing serious injury 
in the form of a decline in sales volumes, market share, gross profit, net profit 
42 Agreement on Safeguards, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods (1994) [hereinafter SA].
43 South Africa – Notification Under Article 12.1(A) Of The Agreement On Safeguards On Initiation 
Of An Investigation And The Reasons For It, WTO/ G/SG/N/6/ZAF/7/ (Mar. 4, 2019).
44 South Africa is in the Southern African Customs Union along with Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho 
and Namibia. The countries adopt a common external trade policy. 
African Practice in International Economic Law: 335
and low capacity utilisation for the period from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2018. 
On this basis, the SACU industry was suffering serious injury which could be 
causally linked to the surge in the volumes of imports of the subject products. 
Morocco also notified the Committee on Safeguard of the initiation of a 
safeguard concerning imports of hot-rolled sheets.45 According to Morocco, 
imports of hot-rolled sheets rose by 54% during the 2014–2018 review period, 
and by 31% in 2018 in relation to 2017. This, it argued, had caused serious 
injury to the domestic hot-rolled sheet industry, resulting in the fall in sales 
volume, output, productivity and production capacity utilization, and a decline 
in financial performance. The investigation was initiated by the Ministry 
of Industry, Investment, Trade and Digital Economy following a petition 
submitted by the company Maghreb Steel, on behalf of the domestic hot-rolled 
sheet industry. The Committee on Safeguard was notified on May 29, 2019. 
Nigeria Closes Border with Neighbours
In August 2019, Nigeria closed its border with Benin, Niger and Cameroon, 
effectively banning all trade—import and export—with these countries. Of 
the three neighbouring countries, the Benin-Nigeria border is a major trading 
route for the sub-region because of the volume of goods that pass through it, 
as well as the direct access to Lagos, Nigeria’s main economic and commercial 
hub. Though border closures are not unusual among African countries, for 
instance, during the height of the Ebola outbreak, Rwanda briefly closed 
the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and since the global 
lockdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, other countries have closed 
their borders.46  However, this was the first time that a country had done so 
for trade-related reasons. 
The primary objective of the border closure was to curb the smuggling of illicit 
goods as well other legal products, particularly poultry, in order to strengthen 
Nigeria’s agricultural sector. Further, the Nigerian government believed that 
smuggling, via the land routes of its neighbours, negatively affected the payment 
of custom duties. As a result, the border closure was intended as a means to 
45 Morocco – Notification Under Article 12.1(A) Of The Agreement On Safeguards On Initiation 
Of An Investigation And The Reasons For It, WTO/ G/SG/N/6/Mar/11 (May 29, 2019).
46 Tom Wills, Coronavirus in Africa: How deadly could COVID-19 become?, Deutsche Welle (DW) 
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-in-africa-how-deadly-could-covid-19-
become/a-53230519. 
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restore customs revenue through Nigeria’s ports. According to Nigeria, the 
border closure was as a result of the high volume of goods smuggled, particularly 
agricultural products from Benin. The World Bank, for instance, estimates 
that about 80% of all imports into the port of Cotonou, Benin’s commercial 
capital, are destined for Nigeria.47 Meanwhile, in 2013, when Nigeria set a tariff 
on rice imports at 70%, Benin reduced its tariff on rice imports from 35% to 
7% the following year.48 This made it easier for smugglers (and even legitimate 
importers) to import rice into Benin at low cost and then traffic it into Nigeria 
to sell at a much higher profit margin – a process known as entrepôt trade.49
The negative impact of the border closure has been severe on small-and-
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the informal sector, particularly given the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Many small and medium size businesses who depend 
on the trade route between Nigeria and Benin are the hardest hit because of 
the closure. These businesses, as a result of crumbling ports and expensive 
customs duties, history and weak border enforcement, have come to rely on 
the ease of the movement of goods along the Nigeria-Benin route. According 
to the Brookings Institute, the informal sector throughout West Africa, and 
particularly in Benin, represents approximately 50 percent of GDP (70 percent 
in Benin, in fact) and 90 percent of employment.50 However, since the border 
closed many of these SMEs have experienced a fall in sales of up to 70 per cent.51 
Thus, even though the aim of the border closure was to reduce smuggling, it also 
disrupted the businesses of many traders who transacted legitimate cross-border 
trade. As a result, the domestic implication for this disruption in the informal 
sector was an increase in the number of people falling below the poverty line. 
47 Signé & van der Ven note, supra note 17. See also Woubet Kassa & Albert Zeufack, Nigeria’s 




49  Kassa & Zeufack, supra note 47. See also Stephen Golub, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye & Christina Golubski, 
The Effects of Nigeria’s Closed Borders on Informal Trade with Benin, Brookings Blog (2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/29/the-effects-of-nigerias-closed-bor-
ders-on-informal-trade-with-benin/. 
50 Stephen Golub, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye & Christina Golubski, The Effects of Nigeria’s Closed Bor-
ders on Informal Trade with Benin, Brookings Blog (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
africa-in-focus/2019/10/29/the-effects-of-nigerias-closed-borders-on-informal-trade-with-benin/.
51 Neil Munshi, Nigerian Border Closures Cut Smuggling but Drive Up Prices,  Financial Times 
(2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ce7abd04-0d10-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84. 
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Another side effect of the closure was the rise in food prices and food 
scarcity. The border shutdown pushed up prices, notably of rice and livestock, 
thus fuelling rapid inflation. This hit consumers hard in a country where the 
majority of household budgets are spent on food. For instance, the price of 
food increased by 11.2% in September of 2019, after falling to a 3 1/2-year low 
in the preceding month.52 With Nigeria having the highest number of people 
living in poverty between the two countries, inflation and food scarcity will 
likely exacerbate the situation.53 
Beyond these short-term effects, however, the more fundamental question 
remains whether the closure will help curb smuggling and increase local 
production. While the shutdown might lessen smuggling in the interim, it 
will not help to address its root causes, which includes, but not limited to, price 
differentials between Nigeria and its neighbours, the high demand for goods 
as a result low levels of domestic production, porous borders, corruption and 
incoherent customs policies. Until Nigeria tackles these issues, border closures 
will remain an inefficient policy tool. 
2020 World Investment Report
The 2020 World Investment Report by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) indicates that global foreign direct 
investment will fall significantly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
According to the report, global FDI flows are forecast to decrease by up to 40 
per cent in 2020 from their 2019 value of $1.54 trillion to below $1 trillion.54 
For Africa, the report is grim. The COVID-19 crisis has arrived at a time when 
FDI was already in decline, with the continent having experienced a 10% drop 
in inflows in 2019 to $45 billion.55 The impacts of the pandemic as well as low 
prices of commodities, especially oil will further exacerbate the FDI decline. 
In particular, FDI is forecasted to further fall by 25 to 40 per cent in 2020, 
52 National Bureau of Statistics. See Nigeria Inflation Rate at 3-Month High of 11.2%, Trading 
Economics (Oct. 15, 2019), https://tradingeconomics.com/articles/10152019105702.htm. 
53 Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, What the African Continental Free Trade Agreement Protocol on Dispute Settle-
ment says about the culture of African States to Dispute Resolution, Afronomicslaw.org (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/09/what-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement-
protocol-on-dispute-settlement-says-about-the-culture-of-african-states-to-dispute-resolution/. 
54  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
2020 (2020), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2020_overview_en.pdf. 
55  Id. at 9.
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and sectors such as aviation, hospitality, tourism and leisure, will be most 
affected.56 Additionally, the lockdown measures will slow investment projects 
while multinational corporations will reconsider new projects due to prospects 
of global recession. National governments, as a result of the economic and 
financial fall out of the pandemic, will place new restrictions on investments. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the grim WTO report, there is hope for the recovery of investment 
flows to the continent in the medium to long run. The entry into force of the 
agreement establishing the AfCFTA, which provides deepening regional 
integration, could mitigate the extent of the investment decline as well as 
help initiate a stabilization and recovery in the aftermath of the pandemic. 
Furthermore, increasing economic ties to the continent by major global 
economies such as the UK-Kenya FTA and the new Cotonou Agreement, 
promoting investment in infrastructure, public–private partnerships, and 
industrial development could help the continent recover in 2021 and beyond. 
56  Id.
